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Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-19
"Payment by owner to contractor - Subcontractor's lien
not affected.
When any subcontractor shall have
actually begun to furnish labor or materials for which
he is entitled to a lien no payment to the original
contractor shall impair or defeat such lien; and no
alteration of any contract shall affect any lien
acquired under the provisions of this chapter•"

Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-20
"When contract price not payable in cash - Notice. As
to all liens, except that of the contractor, the whole
contract price shall be payable in money# except as
herein provided/ and shall not b^ diminished by any
prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset or
counterclaim in favor of the owner and against the
contractor/ except when the owner has contracted to pay
otherwise than in cash, in which case the owner shall
post in a conspicuous place on the premises a statement
of the terms and conditions of the contract/ before
materials are furnished or labor is performed/ which
notice must be kept posted/ and when so posted shall
give notice to all parties interested of the terms and
conditions of the contract. An^ person willfully
tearing down or defacing such notice is guilty of a
misdemeanor•
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SIERRA N E V A D A LUMB*ER CO. v. WHITMORE.

^Cfining of the paper made in 1880, It was
SSyeri. wholly adopted by the parties tbereit^jrfThe agreement of 1880 was made to
ijgtle the controversy existing between the
|jjj£miiil8trator on the one side, and Thomas
t n/l Ann Jenkins, on the other, and not between the minor and administrator as to
"iSayr controversy between them, and it
should be construed so as to carry out the
objects of the parties. If the legal title to
[the/Jots at that time was in the estate of
John A. Jenkins, deceased, it descended to
ISe heirs, subject to the right of administration and the payment of the debts of the
deceased. It would be a fraud on the creditors and upon the rights of the mother to
agree to convey the title to the minor irrespective of their rights. Notwithstanding
auch agreement of 1880, creditors would
still have the right to have the property sold
ito, pay the debts. The administrator reported to the court that the agreement of
1880 was not wholly adopted. The disputes
kept up until the 1881 agreement was made.
-Ann and Thomas Jenkins still remained In
possession of the premises until after the
agreement of 1881, so that it is probable
that the intention of the parties in executing the agreement of 1880 was to settle the
rjghts of the parties as to the ownership,
and not to change the character of the owngphip from that of heir to that of grantee*
Shey all agreed that the legal title was In
the name of John A. Jenkins at the time of
his death. If this was so, then Thomas
and Ann Jenkins had no title they could
convey to the plaintiff. In his inventory to
the court In 1887 the administrator left out
lots 1 and 1G, and did not claim them as belonging to the estate, and in his petition
for the distribution of the real estate these
lots were left out of the schedule. In the
guardianship papers of the plaintiff the
guardian, who is the mother of the plaintiff,
claimed she was entitled to one-third of the
Income of the farm in accordance with the
Agreement In 1881, which claim was inconsistent with the agreement of 1880.
Since 1881 the administrator and guardian
fcave~ acted under the agreement^of 1881,
and have "practically ignored that' of -1880.
In cases where the language used by the
parties to a contract is Indefinite and ambiguous, and hence of doubtful construction,
the practical construction of the parties
themselves is entitled to great, if not controlling, Influence. Chicago v. Sheldon,. 9
Wall. 54, 19 L. Ed. 594. It will be remembered that Barnes was appointed administrator in 1879. At this time Thomas and
Ann Jenkins were holding possession of the
land adversely, and the statute of limitations commenced to run. When the agreement of 1880 was made, these parties were
in possession. The actual change in the
situation did not occur until 1881. The
atatute was therefore running before the
agreement of 1880, and continued to run
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after that agreement was executed, so that
the disability of the plaintiff, even if he
could take title by the agreement of 1880,
did not stop the running of the statute. The
law is well settled that, when the statute
of limitations once commences to run, it
does not cease to run on account of any
subsequent disability, unless such disability
comes within the exception of the statute.
13 Am. & Eng. Euc. Law (1st Ed.) 731, 732.
The administrator or trustee having the
right to commence suit for the recovery of
the property within the time limited by
the statute, and having omitted to do so, he
is barred from commencing such action
against the respondents, who are strangers
to the estate; and his beneficiary is also
barred, and his only remedy, if any, would
be against the administrator and his sureties. Whether such liability now exists we
do n0t decide.
The respondents also claim that the appellant is barred by reason of the compromise as evidenced by the agreement of
1881, by which Thomas and Ann Jenkins
gave up all claim to lots 2 and 3, and the
administrator and guardian gave up to them
all claim to lots 1 and 10, and that by retaining possession of lots 2 and 3 under
such agreement and compromise, and asserting title thereto, he must be held as confirming the compromise;' that he cannot repudiate a contract made for his benefit,
without returning the property in his possession obtained by and through i t Inasmuch as this case has been determined upon other grounds, we forbear further discussion upon this subject.
Th£ decree of the district court is affirmed, with costs.
BASKIN and BARTCH, JJ., concur.

SIERRA NEVADA LUMBER CO. •. WHITMORE.
(Supreme Court of Utah. Dec. 5, 1901.)
MECHANICS' LIENS — SUBCONTRACTOR — EXTENT OF LIEN—VALUE OP MATERIALS—CONTRACT PRICE—NOTICE TO OWNER.

1. Under Rev. St. § 1372, providing that mechanics, material men, contractors, subcontractors, etc., shall have a lien for the value
of services rendered, in the absence of a special contract fixing the value of the services, etc.,
the limit of the lien would be the reasonable
value of the services.
2. Rev. St. § 1372, provides that mechanics,
subcontractors, etc., shall have a lien for the
value of their services, etc. Section 1373 provides that in case of a contract between the
owner and a contractor, the lien shall extend
to the entire price, and that such contract shall
operate as a lien in fa\or of all persons, except the contractor, to the extent of the whole
contract price. Section 1386 requires a subcontractor in his notice of lien to state the
terms and conditions of his contract. Held,
that tpe statute gives a subcontractor under
a contract fixing toe price of the services, etc.,
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a lien, not for the actual value of his services
or the materials furnished, but to the extent of
the subcontract price within the limits of the
original contract
•^3. The owner in his dealings with the con\
tractor is charged with notice of the fact that
\ the contractor has a right to subcontract, and
I that the subcontractor is entitled to a lien1
| within the limit of the original contract price.
4. The owner has a right to retain enough
of the original contract price to cover the lien
of the subcontractor, and apply the same in
satisfaction of such lien.
5. Since the extent of the lien of a subcontractor is the contract price, the owner of the
premises on which a subcontractor files his
lien is not entitled, in an action by the subcontractor to foreclose the lien, to a deduction
for materials furnished the contractor and not
used, it appearing that the building was finished in accordance with the contract with the
owner.
6. Where, in a suit to foreclose a subcontractor's hen for $197 51, it appeared that the
contiact price was $5,500; and that a sum paid
by the owner to the contractor to be paid to
such subcontractor had been applied ou another account between the contractor and the
biibcontractor, and it did not appear that the
ow ner had paid the contract price, or that
there was not enough remaining in his hands
to pay the subcontractor's lien, a credit for
the sum paid would not be allowed. 1
Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county; W. C. Hall, Judge.
Action b> the Sierra Nevada Lumber Company against Samuel M. Whitmore and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff,
defendant Whitmore appeals. Affirmed.
Bennett, Howat, Sutherland & Van Cott,
for appellant
Stephens & Smith, for respondent

and the prices to be charged for ea<
stated; that said estimate was made
petition with other bidders, and ther<
allegation or evidence of fraudulent
charge; that McLachlan examined tin
mate, and agreed to pay the plaintlffi
amount thereof; that among the lte;
furnished to the said McLachlan were
flights of stairs and setting the same in pla!
which, under the said estimate, were tof
charged for at the rate of $125 for each k
way, or $375 in all; that the said stair
and the setting of them in place were o f
reasonable value of $80 each only, or $ 2 4 0 ^
all; that among the items so furnished to the'
said McLachlan was a duantity of sheeting
architrave molding, back band, quarter round
and dimension timber, t i e price to be charged and the amount which the said McLachlan agreed to pay fori which aggregates
$78.02; that the said items last mentioned
were delivered upon the said premises to tbfc
said McLachlan to be used in the said building, but the same were never actually used
therein, nor returned to plaintiff, and there*ft
no evidence to show what became of it; thfct
on October 23, 1899, the defendant Whitmore
g a \ e to McLachlan the Sum of $100, to be
paid to the plaintiff company on account of
materials furnished for the building, but McLachlan paid the same to the plaintiff, and
caused the amount to be credited on another
account; that plaintiff was not aware that
said $100 had been paid by the defendant
Whitmore to be paid on the said account btft;
In good faith applied the said amount to th$
payment of another account of indebtedness
of the said McLachlan to the plaintiff." The
trial court refused to ^llow as a set-off
against the plaintiff's claim the difference
($135) between the contract price of the three
flights of stairs and the sum found as the
reasonable value thereof, $78.02, the contract
price of lumber not actually used, and $100
given to McLachlan to be paid to the plaintiff.

BASKIN, J. This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The appeal is upon
the judgment roll from a deciee awarding to
Jhe Sierra Nevada Lumber Company, respondent, a lien for $197.51 and costs on certain real estate of the appellant and ordering a sale of the same to satisfy the lien.
The trial court found: "That on or about
the 31st day of August, A. D. 1899, the de1. Appellant Whitmore, contends that the
fendant Samuel M. Whitmore, who was the
owner of an interest In the property described $135 item should have been allowed as a
j[njjie complaint ^entered Jnto a-coutract-witli* -credit In his favor.on the ground that under
the defendant J. F. McLachlan for the erec^. the provisions of the mechanic's lien law of
•this~state*TOev.~St:*-§ 1372) the respondent'
*1ta!~by~said?McI&clhraH^^^
was entitled to a lien only for the value of
and others of a terrace of dwelling houses,
described, for the sum of $5,500; that said the materials furnished. Said section pro- \
property is situated in the city and county of vides that mechanics, material men, conSalt Lake; that between August 30 and De- tractors, subcontractors, etc., shall have a
cember 9, 1899, the plaintiff sold and deliv- lieu \ * * for the vallue of service* renered to McLachlan certain materials, which dered, "labor done, or materials furnished,
were furnished for the building upon the • • * whether at the instance of the
premises described; that prior to furnishing owner or of any other pelrson acting by his
said materials the said plaintiff, at the re- authority or under him as a g e n t contractor,
quest of said McLachlan, made an estimate or otherwise. This section, if it stood alone,
of what the said plaintiff would furnish the would limit the lien of the original contractor
same for to the said McLachlan, which said and all other lienholders to the value of the
estimate was itemized as to different ma- services, labor, and materials performed and
terials, lumber, and millwork to be furnished, furnished. In the absence of a special contract fixing the value of the services, labor,
or materials, the law would imply an agree* Lumber Co. T. Partridge. 37 Pac 672, 10 Utah.
ment to pay what they were reasonably121, 329.
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worth, and in such instance their reasonable legislature to limit the Hen to the value of
value would be the limit of the lien; but the services, labor, or materials in cases
where there is an express contract between where there is an express agreement bethe owner and contractor by virtue of section tween the owner and contractor, but its in1373, which provides: "In case of a con- tention was to secure in such cases to a subtract between an owner and a contractor, contractor under a subcontract made in good
the lien shall extend to the entire price, and faith a lien far the subcontract price, within
such contract shall operate as a lien in favor the lftnit of the original contract price.
of all persons except the contractor to the Counsel for the appellant cite in support of
extent of the whole contract price; and after their contention Deardorff v. Everhartt, 74
all such liens are satisfied, then as a lien for Mo. 37, and Laird v. Xoonan (Minn.) 20 N. W.
any balance of the contract price in favor of 354. Prom the first of these cases it appears
the contractor,"—a different rule prevails, that the Missouri statute did not, like ours,
and in that case the lien, without regard to give a lien "for the contract price, but for
reasonable value, extends to, and is limited the materials." From the second it appears
only by, the contract price. Such contract that a subcontractor's lien under the Minoperates as a lien in favor of all persons nesota statute was for the amount of his
who have, under either an express or implied just claim, and not "dependent upon or limcontract with the original contractor, ren- ited b.f the amount due the contractor from
dered services, performed labor, or furnish- the o\|ner under the original contract, nor
ed materials; and the satisfaction of the lien by the! state of the acoount between them."
of such person, If the sum secured thereby Neithe|r of these decisions is in point
equals the original contract price, satisfies
2. The appellant also contends that the
the lien under the original contract; other- $78.02 item should have been allowed in his
wise it satisfies said lien only to the extent favor, because the materials delivered to Mc
of the sum paid in satisfaction of the lien Lachlan, the contractor, at the agreed price
of persons other than the original contractor. of said sum, did not go into the building or
Section 1383 provides that "whoever shall enhance the value of the estate, and theredo work or furnish materials by contract, fore \yere not the basis of a lien under the
express or implied, with the owner as in this provisions of the statute. Under section 1372
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original of the Revised Statutes, all persons furnishcontractor, and all other persons doing work ing materials to be used in the construction
or furnishing materials shall be deemed sub- of a building are entitled'to have a lien. The
contractors." Section 1386 requires a sub- trial court found that the materials in quescontractor, in his notice of intention to hold tion were delivered to said contractor to be
and claim a lien, to state the name of the used in said building. From the fact that
person by whom he was employed or to subcontractors are granted liens by the statwhom he furnished the materials; also the ute, it follows that said section includes materms, time given, and conditions of the con- terials delivered to the contractor to be used
tract. In the provisions of the statute cited in the building. The failure by the contractor
the rights of a contractor to make subcon- to use the materials in the building did not
7 tracts is recognized. The owner, in his injure the appellant, because the extent of
dealings with the contractor, is charged with the Men on his property was the contract
notice of that fact, and that a subcontractor, price, which he was bound in any event to
by virtue of the original contract, is entitled, pay either to the contractor or the subconunder his subcontract, to a lien, within the tractor after the house was finished in ac| limit of the original contract price. Lumber cordance with his contract with McLacblan.
] Co. v. Partridge, 10 Utah, 322, 329, 37 Pac.
3. Appellant contends that the $100 item
572. The subcontract_ price may be less
should have been allowed as a credit in his
or greater " thati-the " V* ~
SitKP'Of - the"-Berrices-pf
cende^^^aboi^iper^rmed^o^^p^grjp
i» , ^"r- avori—»Ii*"the-opinioiudeliver
nished. If much lessTTSTlne absence or rraW 1 inJUiniber_Co. v. Partridge, 10 Utah, 322or mistake, certainly the subcontractor would
not be entitled to a lien for their reasonable of the plaintiff attached at the time the first
value; and, it much greater, in the absence materials were furnished to the^contractor;
of fraud or mistake, it follows that he would that Partridge, the owner, was bound to take
be entitled to a lien for the full subcontract notiqe of such lieu, and any payments made
pi ice, as it is the original contract which, by him to the contractor after such lien atunder the statute, in cases like the one at tached must be held to have been made at his
bar, operates as a lien in favor of the sub- risk and peril." In the case at bar the macontractor and is limited to the original terials were furnished between September 30
contract price. The owner has the right and December 9, 1S09, and the payment of
In self-protection to retain enough of the the $100 was made October 23, 1890. The
original contract price to cover the liens of contract price for the building was $5,500.
subcontractors, and apply the same in satis- It was not alleged in the answer or found
faction of such liens; but In no other respect by the trial court that the owner has paid
relating to the subcontract price is the owner the contract price, or that there Is not reconcerned. It was not the intention of the maining in his hands enough of the contract
price to satisfy the lien of the respondent;
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•o that it does not affirmatively appear that
the appellant has been injured by the failure
to credit that amount on the account for materials furnished to the contractor.
It Is ordered that the judgment be affirmed,
and that the appellant pay the costs.
MINER, C. J., and BARTCH, J., concur.

HARRIS v. LARSEN et aL
(Supreme Court of Utah. Dec. 6, 1001.)
HOMESTEAD—EXEMPTION—BILL OF S A L E DEBT—PURCHASE PRICE.

Where a purchaser of realty gave a bill of
sale of certain hogs as a part of the purchase
price, a judgment in an action for failure to
deliver the hogs was for a "debt created for
the purchase price of the land," within Rev.
St. 1898, §§ 1150, 3247, making the land subject to execution for such debts, though a
homestead.
Baskin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from district court, Weber county;
H. H. Rolapp, Judge.
Action by Emma E. Harris against Henry
Larsen and another. From a judgment in
favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
N. J. Harris, for appellant
ger, for respondents.

M. D. Less in-

MINER, C. J. I do not concur in the opinion of my learned associate, Mr. Justice
BASKIN, in this case. Mr. Atwood sold the
land to the respondents for $1,500, said sum
to be*paid in cash and 16,000 pounds of hogs.
All of the purchase price, amounting to $884,
was paid, except something less than 16,000
pounds of hogs. The hogs were to be received as final payment of the purchase price
of the land, in accordance with the bill of
sale, but they were never delivered, and judgment was obtained therefor, as part of the
purchase price of the land. Executionjwas
Issued on the judgment, and the land In question was "sold thereon. The judgment was
for a fteh+ created JV>r» a ^ a r t ^ f ^ e ^ m ^ m
e"cution therefor, under section JU56, Rev.^St. 1808,^which,
5
anthorizes^a? libmestead to be sold on execution in satisfaction of a judgment obtained
on debts created for the purchase price thereof. Section 3247, Id. This statute is very
broad. Under our statutes, words and
phrases are to be construed according to the
context and the approved usage of the language. Section 2497, Rev. S t 1808. A
"debt" as defined by Webster, is "that which
is due from one person to another, whether
money, goods, or services; that which one
person is bound to pay to another, or to perform for his benefit; that of which payment
is liable to be exacted; due; obligation; liability." Anderson's Law Dictionary defines

(XJtah

"debt" as follows: "In its most general
sense, that which is due from one person to
another, whether money, goods, or services;
that which one is bound to pay or to perform
for another." Novell v. People, 7 N. Y, 124;
Kimpton v. Brohson, 45 Barb. 625. Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines "debt" to mean
all that is due a man under any form of obligation or promise. City of Erie's Appeal,
01 Pa. 402. Larsen agreed to deliver the
hogs as a part of the purchase price of the
land. They represented that part of the purchase price that was not paid in cash. They
were never delivered. Until delivered, Larsen was owing the amount they represented
on the land. Atwood had no vendor's lien,
under the ordinary acceptance of that term,
but he held a debt and obligation against
Larson for the derjt represented by the hoga.
Whether such debt was evidenced by a bill
of sale of the hogs, upon which a partial delivery was made, or upon a verbal promise
to pay, makes no difference. The debt and
obligation existed, and it grew out of the sale
of the land. That obligation was given for
a part of the purchase price, and the statute
gave. Atwood the right to levy his execution
upon the homestead to satisfy i t as a debt
created for the purchase price. A Judgment
obtained upon a contract made in part payment of land is a purchase-price judgment,
whether the promised payment was to have
been paid in money, or by the delivery of
chattels. Doubtless one object in framing
the statute in question was to protect innocent grantors from the fraud and deception
of grantees who seek, through sharp practices, to rely on their homestead rights as a
defense to the payment of a just debt or obligation created for its purchase.
In my opinion, the judgment is not supported by the findings, and should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs. It
is so ordered.
I
I

i

BARTCH, J., concurs.
_ BASKIN, J.~ (dissenting)r Tnls !s an action
in ejectment. The <^ase wa,g jTirtl wK h n t l t *i
in favor of
tie^efendantfigB33ie^on 1 f% (lQbUdfl "IflfH fW
is whether the findings support the judgment
,TlHMriaL*courttfound-"tbat
onrJuly'IpiBffS?
said R. A. Atwood executed a deed conveying
said premises [described In the complaint] to
defendant Henry Larsen; that the purchase
price of said land was $1,500, of which $884
was paid in cash, and that said defendants,
Henry Larsen and Krlstine Larsen, gave
said Atwood a bill of sale of 16,000 pounds of
hogs as a final payment upon said premises;
that said Atwood agreed to accept the said
hogs as a final payment upon said land, hat
that said hogs were not delivered to bimfi
that said hogs were In the possession of said
defendants at the time of the execution o£
said deed, and that there was no actual
change of possession pf the same; that the/
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-1JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

in

this

action

is predicated on appellant's

right to appeal from all final orders and
of

right

under

Title

78-31a-19

amended 1985, and Rule

3(a) of

of

judgments as

the

the Rules

a matter

Utah Code Annotated,
of the

Utah Court of

Appeals.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant brought
Salt Lake

this action

Department, to

the respondents1

in the

foreclose its

real property

Fifth Circuit Court,

mechanic's lien against

and for

recovery under the Utah

bond law against the respondents/owners for failure to

provide a

bond.

law

Judgment was

granted in

claims,

limited

but

limitation was
owner and the
foreclosure
denied.

based on
general

of

its

to

on

the

an

amount

the amount

mechanic's

of

$1,800.00.

The

of the contract between the

contractor.

Denial was based on

limitation

favor of the appellant on the bond

lien

a finding

Appellant's
and

claim seeking

attorney's

that there

fees was

was a verbal

contractor's authority to purchase materials

outside his own inventory.

-2ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Do the

facts, as proved at trial, support a finding of

a verbal limitation or agreement not to use

materials outside of

the contractor's inventory?
2.

Under

the

facts

of

this case is a material supplier

precluded from enforcing an otherwise valid lien against an owner
because of a verbal limitation contained in the agreement between
the owner and general contractor against using outside suppliers?
3.

Under

the

recovery of a bond
interpreted as

Utah
law

Bond

Law,

claimant

referring to

to

is

the language limiting

the

the prices

"prices

agreed upon11

agreed upon between the

owner and his contractor or, as appellant urges, is it
agreed upon

the price

between bond law claimant and the general contractor

or owner?
4.
a

Is there any basis under the facts as proved to support

finding

that

the

contract

"agreed price11 was $1,800.00

or

rather than $2,600.00 testified to at trial?
5.

Is

appellant

entitled

to

recover

attorney's

necessary to bring this appeal?

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.

Mechanicfs lien statutes.

Utah Code
Annotated Section
38-1-3.
entitled to lien -- What may be attached.

Those

Contractors,
subcontractors
and
all persons
performing any services or furnishing any materials
used in the construction, alteration or improvement of
any building
or structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner and licensed architects and
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs,
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates

fees
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of cost,
surveys or superintendence or who have
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or
concerning which they have rendered service, performed
labor, or furnished materials, for the value of the
service rendered, labor performed or material furnished
by each respectively, whether at the instance of the
Owner or of any other person acting by this authority
as agent, contractor or otherwise. This lien shall
attach only to such interest as the owher may have in
the property.
Utah Code Annotated
Apportionment
-Costs
subcontractor

Section 38-1-17.
and
attorneys'

Costsfee to

As between the owner and the contractor the court
shall apportion the costs according to the right of the
case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a
lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including the
costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of
lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of
claim of lien.
Utah Code

Annotated Section

38-1-18.

Attorneys1

fees
In any action brought to enforce any lien under
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
2.

Bond law statutes.

Utah Code Annotated Section
protect mechanics and materialmen.

14-2-1.

Bond to

The owner of any interest in land entering into a
contract,
involving
$2,000
or
more,
for
the
construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any
building, structure, or improvement upon land shall,
before any such work is commenced, obtain from the
contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price,
with good and sufficient sureties, conditions for the
faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment
for material furnished, equipment and materials rented,
and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest
may appear. Any person who has furnished or rented any
equipment or materials, or performed labor for or upon
any such building, structure, or improvement, for which
payment has not been made, has a direct right of action
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against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable
value of the rented materials or equipment furnished/
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or
for labor performed, not exceeding the prices agreed
upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after the
completion, abandonment, or default in the performance
of the work provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be
interested, upon request.

exhibited

to

any

person

Utah Code Annotated Section 14-2-2. Failure to
require bond -- Direct liability —
Limitation of
actions.
Any person subject to the provisions of this
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein
required, shall be personally liable to all persons who
have furnished materials or performed labor under the
contract for the reasonable value of such materials
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however,
in any case the prices agreed upon. Actions to recover
on such liability shall be commenced within one year
from the last date the last materials were furnished or
the labor performed.
3.

Constitutional provisions.
None.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During April,

1985, the respondents were making repairs and

improvements to their carpet and furniture store located on State
Street in

Salt Lake

roof damage
winter.

City, Utah.

resulting

heavy

snow

pack

of

the previous

(Transcript 131)

The respondents
when

from

The repairs were occasioned by

a

customer,

respondents

and

were in the process of making these repairs
Mr.

Roy

inquired

Gurule,
about

presented

the

work

himself

in

to the

progress.

The

respondent testified that Mr. Gurule told them, "I can save you a
lot

of

money."

The

respondents

testified

that

indicated he could save them a lot of money because
it [ceiling

Mr. Gurule
he, "brought

tiles and ceiling grids] in by the truckload, bought

it direct and cut out the middle man.11

He Represented himself as

a contractor who handled big jobs and who bought materials by the
car load.
At

(Transcript 132-133)
this

initial

conversation, the

meeting,

based

respondents claim

the

be paid

respondents

were

the

foregoing

that a verbal agreement was

reached for the purchase of the materials.
$2,600.00" to

on

The price was "around

in cash less credit for the repairs v/hich
making

to

a

sofa

for

Mr.

Gurule.

(Transcript 133)
The court
that

the

found this agreement included a verbal limitation

contractor

was

not

to

purchase

outside

his

own

inventory.
Thereafter,
ceiling tiles, was

the

appellant,

contacted

by

a
the

supplier

of

contractor.

sheetrock and
Mr. Gurule

-6-

ordered

certain

materials

respondents1 property,
approximately

the

on

his

first

Mr.

account

account

Gurule

was

in

of

used for improvements to the

May

grids

respondents1 property.
18)

be

(Transcript 107-108)

ceiling tiles and light
Gurule

to

for

and

were
use

had

May 21 , 1985, sheetrock,

sold
in

(Transcript

Thereafter, between

by

the

appellant

to Mr.

improvement

of

the

Plaintifffs Exhibit

106 and

an open account with the appellant which

good

standing.

(Transcript

109,

25-35 and

Plaintiff's Exhibit 13)
The various

materials purchased

through the appellant were

either picked up at the appellant's warehouse by
Gurule

or

appellant's

delivered

directly

employees.

Bailey; Transcript

65, testimony

Mr. Gurule.

the

(Transcript

were usually delivered with
mailed to

to

the son

respondents'
51,

testimony

of Teddy Gurule)

the materials

of Roy

store
of

by

Vales

The invoices

and were subsequently

All invoices identified each purchase as

being for the Mastercraft warehouse (the identification which was
used

for

the

respondents'

store).

(Transcript

8-24

and

Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 through 12)
The terms of the account with the appellant as set

forth on

the invoices and by prior history was that payment be made within
30 days of delivery.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13

and Transcript 31)

The reasonable and fair market value of all materials provided on
account, less credits for all returned items, was
being

in

the

Transcript 96)

sum

of

$3,327.00.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 and

This value represented the normal

appellant for these materials.

established as

(Transcript 33)

charges of the

-7-

At
recording

approximately
of

the

end

appellant's

respondents by

lien,

telephone to

contractor (Mr. Gurule) and
respondents replied
payment.

May,

the

1985,

prior

appellant

to

the

contacted

the

request that he make payment to the
the appellant

that he

by joint

check.

The

had already paid the contractor one

(Transcript 105 and 134-135)

Shortly thereafter, the
belonging

of

to

the

otherwise was

respondents

able to

further payments
Eventually, the

contractor
and

unlawfully

forged^

negotiate the

the

took checks

signatures

instruments for

cash.

or
No

were made by the respondents to the contractor.
stolen

funds

were

repaid

to

the contractor.

(Transcript 112)
Appellant caused
the sum of $3,435.17.

a lien to be recorded on June 7, 1985, for
This

amount was

time of the filing of the lien.
and otherwise stipulated to
requirements.

the amount

Said lien Was properly notarized

at trial

to have

met the statutory

(Transcript 28 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 14)

of the lien filing was sent to the respondents by
as

required

owing at the

by

statute

appellant's attorney.

and

demand

for

Notice

certified mail

payment

was made by

(Transcript 29 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 15)

When no payment was made, this action was commenced.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The facts

do not

support a finding of an agreement or

limitation on the contractor's agency.
II.

Materials were supplied at

the

instance

of

a person

acting under authority of the owner.
III. The measure of damages under the bond law should be the
contract price between

the

material

supplier

and

the general

contractor or owner.
IV.

The amount

awarded under

the bond

law is contrary to

the uncontradicted testimony at trial.
V.

Appellant is entitled to

recover reasonable attorney's

fees necessary to bring this appeal.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF AN
AGREEMENT OR LIMITATION ON THE CONTRACTOR'S AGENCY
Appellant urges
most favorable to the
that there

that the

facts do

respondent,

not, even

support

the

in the light

court's finding

was only limited authority granted to the contractor.

All of the evidence

consists

respondent

Call.

William

solely
There

of
were

the

testimony

of the

no other witnesses who

testified to the "agreement.11
The testimony is set forth in its entirety

on pages 132-136

and 138-139 of the transcript (see Addendum).
The entire conversation recites the "puffing" of Mr. Gurule.
There is no testimony that Mr. Call, a knowledgeable businessman,
told the

contractor that

he accepted

these claims as a binding

-9limitation.

The only

nature are

the

relate to

statements of

replies

to

a definite and restrictive

counsel's

leading

questions which

the representations and do not pertain to the contract

or agreement.
On

his

own,

impression" that
brought

it

in

agreement was

Mr.

Call

he got
by

testifies

this out

to

of some

truckloads.

The

being

"under

the

warehouse or that he

evidence

concerning the

that Mr. Gurule would do the work for a low price.

The limitations were not part of the agreement.
Elsewhere, it was testified
on this

small job

his son.

regularly and

(Transcript

testified at
appellant

75)

two occasions

because

that this

the

"big contractor" was

did some patching himself with
respondents1 own employee

Also, the

that he knew the materials came from

respondent

and

hip

son

told

him so.

(Transcript 119 and 125)
Further, the

appellant testifies

and his bookkeeper also called.
raised

at

these

that he

called Mr. Call,

No mention of the limitation was

conversations.

Thus,

this

circumstantial

evidence contradicts the claim of limited authority.
There is no creditable evidence that there was

a meeting of

the minds restricting the contractor's authority.

II.
MATERIALS WERE SUPPLIED AT THE INSTANCE
OF A PERSON ACTING UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE OWNER
Assuming that there was sufficient evidence for the court to
find a limitation on the authority of the
materials

outside

of

his

own

cpntractor to purchase

inventory, does this limitation
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between

the

owner

and

his

supplier from relying on

contractor

the protection

prevent
of the

the

material

mechanic's lien

law?
The statute itself is very broadly worded.

It provides:

Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing
any services or furnishing any materials used in the
construction, alteration or improvement of any building
or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner; . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon
or concerning which they
have rendered services,
performed labor or furnished materials, for the value
of the service rendered, labor performed or material
furnished by each respectively, whether at the instance
of the Owner or of any other person acting by this
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Section
38-1-3, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.]
Thus,

the

specific

provided materials

question

"at the

is

whether

instance of

the

the owner

person acting as agent, contractor, or otherwise."

respondent
or any other

The answer is

immediately both yes and no.
Yes,

the

materials

were

ordered

from the appellant by a

person who was engaged by the respondent/owner as his agent to do
the work.

No,

in ordering from the appellant he was not acting

within his authority and not
answer is

his

agency.

The correct

not found in the language of the statute, but in cases

interpreting it.
of a

within

An

analogous situation

involves the authority

lessee to encumber the fee simple estate by contracting for

improvements to the real property.
In Interiors
(Utah 1982),

Contracting, Inc.

the liability

of a

vs. Navalco,

lessor for contracts made by a

lessee for improvements to real property owned by
addressed by
law is

the Utah

identical; i.e.,

Supreme Court.
was the

648 P.2d 1382

the lessor was

The principle question of

agency between

the lessor and

-11-

lessee limited

in such

a way

so as

to preclude lien liability

against the lessor's fee interest?
The

written

expressly

lease

required

between

that

all

expense and that the

lessee

materialmen.

the

authority
mechanic's

But,

in

the

lien

promptly

to

and

the

lessee

be made at lessee's

pay

all

contractors and

said this express limitation of

"cannot

as

lessor

improvements

court

lease
law

the

override

persons

the

effect

of the

not a party to the lease,

Metals Manufacturing Company vs. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74,
395 P.2d 914 (1964)."
and his agent was
looked to

Thus, the limited agency between the owner

not the

the benefits

deciding factor.

Rather,

conferred, participation

the court

of the lessor,

and other factors so "it can be said with justice that the lessee
in such case is acting for the lessor."
Thus, if
protect a

Ibid, at 1387.

an expressed limitation in a lease cannot, per se,

lessor

from

understanding based

lien

liability,

on representations

4

faith,

looking at

supplied

benefits

concluded that

products
conferred

the limitation

to
and

materialman who, in

that

contractor.

other

factors,

is not

a verbal

from a contractor cannot

limit the lien liability of an owner against
good

fortiori,

Instead,
it

can be

valid or controlling, but

that the owner established the agreement,

received the benefits,

and therefore authorized the work.
In Frehner vs. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 18 Utah 2d. 422 (1976),
an owner gave his daughter permission to direct construction of a
residence for

herself and

her children

on land

that he owned.

She hired a landscape architect he disliked and the owner refused

-in-

to pay

on the

ground that

he had not authorized the work.

court found that he had nevertheless allowed the work to
without objection and had impliedly approved the work.

The

be done
The court

found that his consent to allow his daughter to proceed to direct
the

work

included

consent

to

have

the

landscaper

do

the

landscaping.
The court looked to the facts which were reasonably inferred
from the

circumstances as

the basis for determining the consent

and authority granted to the daughter to engage the plaintiff.
A few
They

have

other

jurisdictions

generally

said

have

that

addressed

this question.

the consent required by a lien

statute is a consent that a party have authority to

commence the

work and that the statutes do not require specific consents as to
the price, the specific nature of the work, or a
for

the

work.

In

Viccory

consent to lien

v. Richardson, 75 N.E. 136 (Mass.

1905), the court analyzed a case where the owner claimed that the
architect had

been given express limitations as to the amount of

money that he was authorized to spend for the improvements.

The

architect had, contrary to these express instructions, authorized
a contractor to build for an amount in excess of
limit.

this authorized

The court said:

It is claimed that this implied authority, although it
empowered him to make such contracts, did not confer
any authority
binding the
respondent to pay an
increased price, as he was limited to the amounts
specified in the contract with himself. This would be
true if the petitioner sought to recover in an action
of contract where there was no evidence of ratification
. . . until informed to the contrary, she was supposed
and believed that the petitioner was building the house
for the original price. The consent given, however, is
to the performance of the work, not to lien, or the
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amount for which, under it, the interest of the owner
in the land can be charged^ [Emphasis added.]
The foregoing

ruling comports

Utah lessor/lessee

cases and

apparent that

contractor

authority

the

within

the

with the

Frehner.
(in

By{ such analysis, it is

this

requirements

analysis under the

qase

of

the

Mr.

Gurule) had

lien law to obtain

materials, make certain repairs and install the materials
premises.

Whether

the

consent

was

limited

or

on the

not,

such

limitation, if any, cannot override the intent of the lien law.
The only possible
would

be

if

limitation

the

appellant

(assuming

However, the

exception

one

to

knew

the
or

existed)

foregoing conclusions

should

in

have

known of a

parties1 contract.

the

authority of the contract was, to the appearance of

third parties, unlimited authority to

contract

There

the

was

nothing

unusual

about

for

the

parties1

work.

conduct

or

relationship.
Clarey Haulk was called
testified that

the

respondents

Claron

knew the

Bailey.

materials were

Mr.

site by

(the contractor

they told

and his

the appellant.

testified that

son) that

supplied by the

(Transcript

119)

Ted and

Roy Gurule

him the materials
This same witness

when certain materials were returned, that it was

his understanding that the
Bailey and

trial and

Haulk testified that when the

materials were delivered to the job

were from

at

during the construction he was an employee of the

respondent and that he
appellant,

by

that this

materials were

Igoing back

to Claron

understanding was based on representations

made to him by the respondent, Bill Call, and his son, Mike Call.
(Transcript 125)

-14The

testimony

of

appellant's

employee

and

bookkeeper,

Lynwood Christensen, the testimony of appellant and the testimony
of

Vales

Bailey

each

stated

that copies of the invoices were

given to the person picking up
the

materials

when

they

the materials

or were

left with

were delivered, and that each invoice

stated on it that the materials were provided for the Mastercraft
warehouse or indicated that they were on appellant's forms.
Transcript cited

in Statement

of Facts)

None

(See

of the invoices

were on a form or invoice from the contractor, Mr. Gurule.
This

testimony

is

consistent

course of business dealings

with

the

normal and usual

between contractors

and suppliers.

There is no testimony that this limitation or understanding as to
where the materials were to

come

from

was

made

known

to the

appellant or would, under reasonable course of business dealings,
have been known to the appellant.
The decision of the court below granting the owner the right
to verbally

limit the authority of his contractor without notice

to a material supplier

creates

an

impossible

condition.

The

supplier would need to obtain contrary confirmation from an owner
in

each

job

for

which

he

is

asked

to

supply

materials.

Otherwise, owners could routinely provide in their contracts that
contractors would obtain materials

only from

certain parties or

only for certain prices and, thereby, defeat the statutory rights
of these parties to claim liens.
Such is obviously not
establishing

the

lien

the intention
law.

As

Contracting, supra, the purpose of the

was

of the
stated

legislature in
in

Utah Mechanic's

Interiors
Lien Law
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is to

"provide protection

to those who enhance the value of the

property by supplying labor and materials . .
lien

statutes

broadly

to

effectuate

.we

construe the

th^t purpose.11

Ibid, at

1386.
The Utah Court has also repeatedly stressed that the statute
is to

be interpreted broadly to the favor of lien claimants.

stated in Rio Grande

Lumber Company

vs. Darke,

50 U.

As

144, 167

P.241:
The aim and purpose of the Utah Mechanics Lien Law is
to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor
and furnish
the materials
which i enter into the
construction of a building
or other improvement,
although the owner of the premises is most likely to
suffer. [Emphasis added.]

III.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES UNDER THEJ BOND LAW
SHOULD BE THE CONTRACT PRICE BETWEEN THE
MATERIAL SUPPLIER AND THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR OR OWNER
The third issue raised is the amount of damages for
plaintiff is

allowed recovery

v/hich a

for improvements supplied when an

action is brought under the bond law.

The specific

language of

the statute states:
[A] person subject to the provisions of this chapter,
who shall fail to obtain a good and sufficient bond,
shall . . .
be personally liable to all persons who
have furnished materials or performed labor under the
contract for the reasonable value of such materials
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however,
the prices agreed upon.
U.C.A. 14,-2-2. [Emphasis
added.]
The question before the court
"prices agreed upon."

is

the

meaning

of

the language

-±6-

Similar language appears in Section 14-2-1 where it says:
[S]uch bond shall run to the owner and to all other
persons as their interests may appear; any person who
has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon
any such building, structure, improvement, payment for
which has not been made, shall have a direct right of
action against the sureties upon such bond for the
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor
performed not exceeding however in any case the price
agreed upon.
The

language

in

both

sections
upon11

instances the "price agreed
devoted to

the rights

is

is

identical.

contained

of materialmen.

in

In both
a sentence

There are no Utah cases

interpreting this language.
Appellant argues that this
with

a

meaning

consistent

language

with

the

should

be interpreted

general

practice in the

construction industry.
A materialman or
supply labor
price.

laborer

or materials

would

additional work

agrees to

case

such

a provision
as

one

or

agree to

perform that work

for an owner upon a lump sum bid or

agreed price which would be the sum of
prices plus

bid

to a general contractor for a certain

The general contractor then

and usually

usually

other material

for overhead and profit.

before

the

court

where

the

and labor

It is a rare
amount

of a

materialman's bid and the general contractor's bid are for almost
the same work and same materials.

It

is also

unusual that the

general contractor price is lower than the materialman.
The

interpretation

of

the

supplier the right to recover
general

contract

in

Such an interpretation

the

addition
does

court

not

to

below

profit

and

would

give

overhead

the

of the

his own overhead and profit.
make

sense.

Rather,

it is

-17-

logical that

the legislature intended that the supplier get what

he bargained for and nothing more.
A further reason for favoring this construction is
materialmen and

laborers whom

protect have no control over
contractor and

the owner.

the statute
the

The

provide labor or materials at a
labor or

materialman have

an offer may be
flow, or

as an

may be

contract

that the

has been designed to
between

the general

general contractor may agree to
price below

agreed to work.

inducement for

that for

which the

The reasons for such

the work,

to assist cash

the result of a mistake or misrepresentation on

behalf of the general contractor.

It is

not fair

or consistent

with the

statutory purpose to limit the materialmen or laborerfs

recovery

to

this

false

price

and

thereby

prejudice

the

materialman or laborer for such negligent or misleading acts by a
general contractor.
In this case, the contract is the result of an extremely low
price being

offered to

induce the

the face of the statutory purpose
in good

faith supplied

owner's assent.
to limit

It flies in

the respondents, who

materials, to a prilce less than the fair

market value evidenced by the material supplier's price.

IV.
THE AMOUNT AWARDED UNDER THE BOND LAW IS
CONTRARY TO THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
The judgment entered by the court was for $1,800.00 based on
an

interpretation

of

the

law

(opposed above in III) that the

contract of the owner limited the amount of the bond claim.

-18-

However,
$2,600.00.

the

testimony

was

that

the

contract

was

for

(Transcript 133 and later at 141)

The sum of $1,800.00 was never

mentioned during

the trial.

It is undisputed that the appellant received no compensation from
the owner or contractor, and so there is no basis

for a judgment

of less than $2,600.00, even under the respondents1 theory of the
law.
The case
delay,

and

was tried
final

on two

motions

occasions, separated

argued

months later.

by a long

The court was

likely confused without benefit of a transcript.

V.
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEES NECESSARY TO BRING THIS APPEAL
At trial, the appellant
his claim

introduced testimony

in support of

for attorney's fees sought under the provisions of the

mechanic's lien

law.

The

attorney's fees

as made

appellant

renews

its

request for

at trial and those associated with this

appeal in the event it is successful in its claim

under the lien

law.
It is
and that

undisputed that
notice as

respondents.

the lien was proper and timely filed

required by

the lien

law was

given to the

Utah Code Annotated 38-1-18 clearly provides:

In any action brought to enforce any lien under
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.

-19-

Th is

language

unambiguously

entitles

recover his attorney's fees as part of his

the

appellant

award if

to

this action

is successful.
Appellant has

been required

to pursue this appeal in order

to secure his lien rights as set forth by the statutes and should
be entitled

to recover

the costs of such Appeal as provided for

by the same statutes.

CONCLUSION
Appellant should be entitled to recover under the mechanic's
lien

claim

as

set

forth

previously found no defect
for the issue of agency.

in

its

in the

complaint.

The court has

appellant's compliance except

No other defects ^re appealed.

The court should look at the apparent qonsent granted by the
owner to his contractor to proceed with the
prejudice the
aspect

of

appellant on

that

agency

the basis

which

is

work and

should not

of an undisclosed limited

contrary

to

the reasonable

expectations of the parties.
In

addition

thereto,

the

appellant should be entitled to

recover under the bond law for the amount of his
reasonable value of the materials supplied.
should not be limited by the amount of
with

the

contractor

which

was

based

invoices or the

Appellant's recovery

the respondents' contract
on

a

grossly underbid

proposal made to induce the respondents into purchasing from him.

Such interpretation

would be contrary to the express purposes of

the statute.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of November, 1987.

^U0K.<
Steven F. Alder
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM
i —

Q

Can you tell the Court what was said between yourself

and Mr. (3urle from the moment he first presented himself as a
customer in your store?
A

Well , he told me, he says, I ^ee you re remodeling,

what are your pl<ans, I told him.

He said, well, I can save you

a lot of money.
Q

Now, prior to this time, had he expressed interest

in any of the furniture or looked around, o r —
A

I think he was in to have a sofa redone or something

like that.
Q
describe.

Okay.

Back to the conversation you began to

He said that he saw that you were remodeling, that

he could save you a lot of money?
A

Uh huh.

Q

Before you responded, did he say anything else?

A

I told him—no, I told him that we'd already

contracted the job, as far a s —
Q

Who had you contracted with?

A

Roy—I forgot the last name, the guy that did it,

did the labor,
Q

What did Mr. Gurle tell you fae could save you money

A

On the tiles and the grids and the whole thing and

on?

the drop ceiling.
Q

Did he tell you why he could save you money?
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1
2

A

Yeah.

He said he brought it in by the truckloadf

bought it direct and cut out the middleman.

3

Q

Did he tell you what kind of business he was in?

4

A

Yeah f he's a contractor.

5
6
7

He handled big jobs,

bought materials by the carload.
Q

Subsequent to that conversation, did you enter into

an agreement with him to supply materials?

8

A

No.

Prior to that?

9

Q

Prior—well, prior to that time, you had not, he

10

was just talking; but subsequent to that conversation, did you

11

eventually enter into an agreement with him?

12

A

Yes, uh huh.

13

Q

Would you tell the Court to the best of your

14
15

recollection what the terms of that agreement were?
A

Well, he was going to get me a good deal on the tile

16

and the grid, at so much per foot that—that sounded pretty

17

attractive to us, I think it was 39C a square foot.

18
19

Q

And did he give you a total price as to what these

materials would cost you?

20

A

Yeah.

We figured it up, there.

21

Q

And how much was that, do you know?

22

A

As I recall, it was around $2,600.

23

Q

How were you going to pay him for that?

24

A

Cash.

25

Q

Anything

else?
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1

A

And well, of course, I — I

can't recall if it was

2

after that we decided to make a deal 0^1 trade on doing his sofa,

3

too.

4

He had a very fine sofa.
Q

Did Mr. Gurle make any statements to you about where

5

he was going to get his material, otheif than the one you—the

6

statement you've already described?

7
8

A

Well, he said he supplied all his own.

He brought it

in by the truckload and he—that's—and he warehouses it here.

9

Q

Did he e v e r —

10

A

He represented himself as a big contractor.

11

Q

Did he ever tell you that his—any of this material

12

would be supplied locally?

13

A

No.

14

Q

Did you give him any authority to purchase any

15

Absolutely not.

materials locally?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Did you have any idea at any time prior to the filing

18

of the lien in this case, and any subsequent correspondence, that

19

he was obtaining materials locally?

20

A

Oh, I found out before the lien was filed, yeah.

21

Q

When did you find out?

22

A

I think Claron Bailey calle<$ me.

23

Q

Do you recall when that was?

24

A

No, I can't recall; but it was prior to the lien

25

because Claron and I discussed the situation quite thoroughly
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1

in regarding payment, whether LeRoy was going to pav for it or

2

what the situation was.

3

Q

Was that after the last materials had been supplied?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

When you talked to Mr. Bailey and discussed this

6

matter, prior to that time, had you paid Mr. Gurle any money?

7

A

Oh, yes.

8

Q

How much did you pay him?

9

A

I think the first check was $1,600.

Yeah.

10

whether the second was 600 or 400.

11

to my bookkeeper over at the offices and had her write out the

12

check to him.

13

Q

14

In checks.

I don't recall
I took him over

Prior to that time, had you had any contact whatsoever

with Claron Bailey or anyone representing Claron Bailey?

15

A

I didn't even know the name Claron Bailey.

16

Q

After you'd written these c h e c k s —

17

A

You mean at the time I wrote the checks; right?

18

Q

Yes.

19

A

No.

20

Q

After the material had been supplied and you spoke

I didn't know Claron Bailey.

21

with Mr. Bailey, can you tell the Court what the gist of your

22

conversation with him was?

23

A

Well, whether or not LeRoy—Mr. Bailey said that

24

LeRoy hadn't paid him, when I talked to Mr. Bailey.

And see, I

25

never received any bills from Claron Bailey until after we had
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1

paid LeRoy Gurle.

2

Q

How did you know what amounts to pay LeRoy Gurle?

3

A

He told me.

4

Q

When Mr. Bailey talked with you, you're saying then

And it seemed reasonable, and I paid him.

5

that that's the first time that you had Any inkling that the

6

material had been supplied through Claron Bailey?

7

A

Is when I talked to Claron Bailey, yeah.

I think

8

there was something about—I asked LeRoy about when they delivered

9

that—the egg crates, I says I can't use it, that doesn't do the

10

job.

11

and he told me they had to be shipped in.

12

Or no, we were trying to get the egg crates, I think it was,

Q

Up until the time that you spoke to Claron Bailey

13

after May 21st, some time between May 21st and May 31st, you had

14

no idea what the source of the material was, other than what Mr.

15

Gurle had represented to you; is t h a t —

16

A

That's right.

I did not know that he was doing

17

business locally.

18

out of some warehouse, that he brought it in by the truckload.

19

Q

I was under the impression that he got this

I'll ask you to refer to the pictures in front of

20

you; does that represent—do those pictures show one spot in the

21

south showroom?

22
23

A

Q

Uh huh.
Now, has there been any other sheet work—sheetrock

24

work done on any other portion of your building during that

25

period of time?
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1

Q

Mr. Call, finally, prior to this time, you h a v e -

2

do you recall what amount you've been billed by my office for

3

representing you in this matter, prior to today?

4

A

Oh, I think it's probably—prior to today, on this

6

Q

Yes. On this case.

7

A

I'd say probably eight or $900, something like that.

5

case?

MR. CALL:

8
9
10

a proffer of my own attorney's fees, at the conclusion of our
case.
THE COURT:

11

You may cross-examine.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

12
13

BY MR. ALDER:

14

Q

15

That's all I have, your Honor, other than

You say Mr. Gurle told you he could save you a lot

of money?>

l

16

A

Uh huh.

17

Q

Had you previously received a bid for the light

18

fixtures and the ceiling tiles and sheetrock?

19

A

Yes,

20

Q

And who had you received that bid from?

21

A

I don't recall.

22

Q

Did you compare Mr. Gurlefs bid—

23

A

Well, the—the guy that supplied the labor gave us a

Q

Do you recall—

24
25

bid—
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1
2

A

— f o r the labor and the tile and the whole bit.

And

I believe it w a s —

3

Q

Well, let m e — I don't want to know what the t o t a l —

4

A

You don't want to know what i t —

5

Q

What I would like to ask i$, did you compare the

6

amount of that bid for materials with the bid that Mr. Gurle

7

gave you for materials?

8

A

Well, yes.

9

Q

And did you save a lot of money?

10

Of course.
Did he give you a

good price, based on the price he submitted?

11

A

Based on the price, it was very attractive.

12

Q

All right.

13

And was that the main thing that you

were concerned with, or were you concerned that he got it from

14 I out of town or in town?
15

A

Well, the whole thing—

16

Q

In other words, whether he got it from out of town

17
18

or in town, did you care if the price was good?
A

Well, the reason he told me he could give it to me

19

at that price is that he brings it in by the carload, so it made

20

sense to me, and I — I bought it.

21

Q

Was it substantially less?

22

A

Yeah, quite a bit, yeah.

23

Q

And then later, he said he'd have a sofa redone?

24

A

Uh huh.

25

Q

Do you remember/ did you ever give him a value as to
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